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Malicious insiders present a serious threat to information systems due to privilege of access, knowledge of internal 
computer resources, as well as potential threats on the part of disgruntled employees or insiders collaborating with 
external cybercriminals. Researchers have extensively studied the insider’s motivation to attack from the broader 
perspective of the deterrence theory and have explored the rationale for employees to disregard/overlook security 
policies  using neutralization theory. The present research takes a step further, exploring the aggravating variables 
of insider threat using a multiple case study approach. Empirical research using black hat analysis of three case 
studies of insider threats revealed that while neutralization plays an important role in insider attacks, it takes a 
cumulative set of aggravating factors to trigger an actual data breach. By identifying and aggregating the variables, 
this study presents a predictive model that can guide IS managers to proactively mitigate insider threats. Given the 
economic and legal ramifications of insider threats, this research has implications relevant both for both academics 
and security practitioners.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
End users at the workplace are said to be “the weakest link” in Information Systems (IS) security [Guo, Yuan, 
Archer, and Connelly, 2011; Paans and Herschberg, 1987]. Earlier studies on data breaches showed that many 
hackers turned out to be employees or insiders [Escamilla 1998, Russell and Gangemi 1992, cited in Huseyin 
Cavusoglu, Mishra, and Raghunathan, 2005]. Moreover, it is acknowledged that insider attacks can be more 
destructive and costly than attacks from the outside due to extensive insider knowledge  of an organization’s 
computer resources [Bradford and Hu, 2005; Santos et al., 2012]. Today, a firm’s information-related assets are 
considered among their most valuable resources [Gordon, Loeb, and Sohail, 2010], while the risk of cybercrime 
impacting stakeholders and damaging communities continues to grow at an ever-expanding rate [Martin and Rice, 
2011].  At the same time, because of the ever-increasing mobility of the workforce and the convenience of working 
with corporate data outside the workplace through different static, portable, and online media, threats to IS security 
have expanded into multiple dimensions. As a result, proactive controls are important elements of a firm’s overall 
security architecture since the complete prevention of intrusion is now an unlikely scenario [Bradford and Hu, 2005].   
 
It is estimated that the total cost incurred for one compromised record amounts to nearly $214 [Ponnemon Institute, 
2011], which includes the cost associated with the loss of sensitive organizational data, systems information, 
copyrighted material, trade secrets, as well as classified information.  While statistics on cybercrime incidents (as 
reported for instance by the Identity Theft Resource Centre (ITRC), Privacy Rights Clearing House (PRCH), and the 
Open Security Foundation (SF)) categorize insider threats as purely intentional acts, Loch, Carr, and Warkentin 
[1992], classify them as being either intentional or accidental. If this accidental aspect is taken into consideration, 
then threat from insiders can be regarded as among the most significant contributors to cyber threats. Therefore, an 
empirical investigation of insider threats to identify causation factors will contribute valuable insight for practice, due 
to the detectable, predictable, manageable, and preventable nature of insider threats as compared to external 
threats. In this regard, Benbasat and Zmud [1999, p. 5] stated that “authors who strive to craft relevant articles for 
practitioners must, at a minimum, focus on the concerns of practice, provide real value to IS professionals, and apply 
a pragmatic rather than academic tone.”  
  
Insider threats are among the most serious and difficult security problems to cope with because insiders have 
privileged access to information that is unknown to external attackers; thus, they can abuse organizational trust and 
cause serious harm while leaving little evidence [Colwill, 2009]. For researchers and practitioners, a key challenge in 
addressing the problem of insider threats is the lack of real-world data on insider threats, given that organizations 
are reluctant to report such incidents in order to safeguard their reputation from negative publicity [Hunker and 
Probst, 2011; Keromytis, 2008; Pfleeger and Stolfo, 2009; Pfleeger, 2008; Richardson, 2008]. This lack of data on 
insider threats is a key hurdle impeding the inductive development of validated theoretical models. In addition, most 
available data about insider threats is anecdotal, based on small, biased data sets [Hunker and Probst, 2011], or 
gathered from convenience surveys, making the paucity of data a challenge for insider threat researchers, who need 
solid data to build models, make predictions, and support valid decision-making [Pfleeger and Stolfo, 2009]. Indeed, 
the lack of empirical studies on insider threats reflects the lack of maturity of the scientific literature on this important 
topic. As a result of this lack of data concerning insider threats, both practitioners and researchers have only a 
rudimentary understanding of the factors contributing to insider attacks [Bishop et al., 2008]: there is as yet no 
common vision of the aggregating variables that lead to an insider attack. However, precisely such an  
understanding is required if we are to develop appropriate prevention, detection, and mitigation strategies and 
subsequently evaluate their effectiveness [ibid].  
 
Various socio-technical approaches have been proposed in the literature to mitigate the risk of insider threats. 
However, none of these approaches has provided a comprehensive and empirically validated conceptual model to 
counter insider threats due to a lack of real-world data that would enable analysis and validation of the proposed 
approaches and solutions [Keromytis, 2008]. Consequently, given the lack of empirical research on security risk 
management  [Kotulic and Clark, 2004], IS scholars working directly with black hat data (i.e. data that are accessed 
directly from the source) could promote a fresh look at what is available and perhaps inspire more fruitful research 
into IS security [Mahmoud, Siponen, Straub, Rao, and Raghu, 2010]. By focusing on identifying the mechanisms 
underlying computer crimes from an insider’s perspective, it is hoped that this research initiative will help enhance 
the effectiveness of organizational responses to insider threats. In particular, this work was motivated by the fact that 
efficient risk management of insider attacks is largely dependent on a sound understanding of what gives rise to 
these attacks. This paper thus aims to explore the multifaceted nature of, as well as the causation factors behind 
insider attacks, using black hat research by interviewing the IT managers of three different organizations that have 
been victims of insider attacks. In particular, the structured interviews focused mainly on identifying the motivational 
triggers, the threat/attack methodology, the actors involved, the role played by the organization’s technical and non-
technical IT controls, and the number of aggravating variables that affected the insider attack. As highlighted by 
Mahmoud et al., [2010, p. 433], “the increasing number of scholars who are turning their attention to security 
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research can improve the richness and depth of their research by seeking out new, even unique sources of data that 
show the underlying mechanisms of computer crime and the effectiveness of organizational responses to this 
behavior”. Accordingly, a qualitative approach was deemed suitable to better understand the complex, dynamic and 
often entangled factors that can contribute to an insider attack. Therefore, drawing on related literature and by 
analysing three case studies (related to different sectors) that reported internal data breaches, this research initiative 
aims to develop an empirically validated conceptual model that captures the aggregating variables leading to a 
successful insider attack. Although findings from three cases can more successfully be generalized than findings 
from a single case, the authors selected an additional case from the event management sector to ensure theoretical 
saturation [Yin, 2009] and found that it did not add any significant new insights to what we had already found. 
Hence, we believe that conducting additional case studies within the context of this research project will probably not 
yield new findings. 
 
In this paper, we have adopted Pfleeger and Stolfo’s [2009] categorization of insiders to include employees or ex-
employees, business partners, auditors, consultants, or other people and systems who receive authorized short- or 
long-term access to an organization’s systems. Accordingly, we define ‘insider threat’ as the action or inaction of an 
insider that can jeopardize the safety of data, whether at rest or in motion. We also use the term ‘insider threat’ to 
refer to the misuse of access and/or authority of computer usage by existing or former employees [Garrison and 
Ncube, 2011].This threat can arise either intentionally or accidentally, usually as a result of ignorance, mistakes or 
deliberate acts [Durgin 2007, Lee and Lee 2002, Lee et al., 2003 cited in Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, and Benbasat, 
2010].  In addition, the terms ‘data breach’, ‘attack’, ‘cyber-attack’, and ‘malicious act’ will be used interchangeably in 
this study.  
 
This paper is structured as follows: 
In section two, we present the theoretical background concerning the insider threat landscape, and analyze certain 
statistics related to cybercrime in order to assess the role of insider threats and the domains of attack. In section 
three, we review and assess the IS security models and preventive mechanisms (IT controls) used to combat 
cybercrime; we then go on to identify the research gap and formulate our research question. Section four presents 
the research methodology and outlines the deductive and inductive findings from the three case studies. In section 
five, we discuss the research findings by correlating the analyzed results with the research propositions, thus 
answering the research question. Finally, in section six, we provide a summary of the main findings of this study, 
highlight its implications for research and practice, and outline some directions for future research. 
 
II. THE INSIDER THREAT LANDSCAPE 
Cyber threats can arise from external, internal or unknown sources (CSI Computer Security Institute, 2011). IS 
security technical controls can prevent external attacks to a great extent, but prevention of insider threats depends 
almost entirely on internal IT controls and voluntary policies. In particular, managing internal threats using the 
‘authorized access’ route remains an issue, given (1) the need to prevent illicit access while still allowing authorized 
access to information [Post and Kievit, 1991], and (2) the difficulty in differentiating between authorized and 
unauthorized internal users. 
 
Since a few high-profile cases reported in the early 1970s, the insider threat landscape has not changed 
significantly, given that “frequently security violations involve those who are authorized or have access to the 
sensitive data of concern” [Lehmann, 1981, p. 26]. One of the earliest high profile insider frauds occurred at the 
Equity Funding Corporation of America from 1964 to 1973. The breach involved massive falsification of records and 
supporting documentation, possibly involving hundreds of millions of dollars, and was perpetrated by the 
management to inflate equity [EDPACS, 1973].  Almost half a century later, and despite the progress made in 
hardening security technologies, policies, and controls, safeguarding sensitive corporate data stills remains a 
daunting task. In fact, the very engine that drives the progress in IT infrastructure has also created new security 
threats to this infrastructure, threats which cannot be predetermined and which are not revealed in a predictable 
manner. [Abbas, Magnusson, Yngstrom, and Hemani, 2011]. Remote access, extended enterprise, “bring your own 
device”, and the extranet have enhanced employee productivity, but at the same time have raised new IS security 
risks. Furthermore, while external threats can be mitigated to a certain extent using technical as well as non-
technical controls in addition to security polices, containing insider threats remains a challenging endeavor. For 
researchers, the task of examining insider threats is further complicated due to the difficulty in collecting hard facts 
regarding computer fraud [Richards, 1984] since most affected organizations may not disclose internal data 
breaches. This lack of reporting has made research into cybercrime a real challenge [Kjaerland, 2006], although  
available data breach statistics can provide some guidance for better understanding the impact of the various types 
of insider threats.  
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Magnitude of Insider Threats 
Based on an analysis of historical records of data breaches, a research study conducted by Verizon estimated that 
the magnitude of breaches (median size as measured by the number of compromised records) committed by insider 
sources exceeded those by external sources by a factor of more than ten to one. This finding confirmed earlier 
claims that privileged parties are able to do more damage to an organization than outsiders [Verizon, 2008]. As 
illustrated in Table 1, a basic calculation of risk (likelihood [frequency] x [number of records breached]) shows that 
insiders (including internal employees and authorized business partners) represent the greatest security risk to an 
organization. 
 
Table 1: Risk Severity of Attacks [Adapted from Verizon, 2008] 
Source Likelihood No. of records 
breached 
Impact  Risk (0 to 1) 
External 73 % 30000 21900 0.134 
Internal 18 % 375000 67500 0.41 
Partner 39 % 187500 73125 0.45 
 
The Role of Insiders in Cybercrime  
Since organizations that collect and report publicly available data breaches are more freely accessible in the United 
States (US), we looked at statistical data on intentional breaches by insiders from three US-based organizations, 
namely the Identity Theft Resource Centre (ITRC), the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRCH) and the Open Security 
Foundation (OSF). In addition, since reporting mandates in the US have only been introduced during the past few 
years, we focused on the ratio of the number of insider data breaches to the total number of reported breaches. 
 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of Malicious Insider Threats Among all Threat 
Categories Listed by ITRC, PRCH and OSH 
 
ITRC, an organization engaged in tracing data breaches, began tracking security breaches in 2005 and since 2007 
has prepared annual reports of its findings using five categories: data on the move, accidental exposure, insider 
theft, subcontractors, and hacking. During the period 2007 – 2012, the percentage of insider theft among these five 
categories has grown from 6.1 percent to 8.5 percent [ITRC, 2013]. PRCH, a California-based organization, collects 
data breach statistics in order to identify trends and communicate these to relevant stakeholders. According to 
PRCH, the percentage of insider threats among eight identified data breach categories during the years 2005 to 
2012 grew from 7.35 percent to 12.9 percent [Privacy Rights Clearing House, 2013].  By the end of October 2013 
the percentage of insider threats had increased to 15.1 percent. The Open Security Foundation, another non-profit 
US organization dedicated to tracking and reporting security breaches, revealed that the percentage of breaches 
due to malicious insiders increased from 7 percent in 2005 to 8.63 percent in 2012, but by the end of September, 
2013, the share of insider threats had increased once again to 13.53 percent [Datalossdb, 2013]. Figure 1 illustrates 
the percentage share represented by insider threats among all cyber threats from 2003 through to October 2013 
(Insider threat data from January to October 2013 for ITRC was not available at the time of this paper’s submission). 
 
  
Volume xx Article x 
5 
We should note, however, that the above statistics did not take into account the number of breached records nor the 
value of these records. Recall, to this effect, that insiders have both the knowledge and the access privilege to target 
the most valuable records. In addition, while the reported data breach statistics point out the seriousness of insider 
attacks, the motives or the aggravating variables of these attacks are not evident in these studies. This lack of 
motivating threat variables points out the potential role IS security theories, IT models, standards, and controls can 
play in exploring the intrinsic nature of insider threats, which in turn can point the way towards developing proper risk 
mitigation strategies. Hence, an exploration of the dynamic nature of insider threats needs to be conducted from the 
perspective of appropriate theories that look into the deeper levels of insider threats, taking into account the subject 
as well as the object of these threats. 
III. INFORMATION SECURITY MODELS, FRAMEWORKS, AND CONTROLS 
The primary goal of information security is to protect data confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-
repudiation, while getting most value from security by insuring that technology investments protect the right things 
[Tsiakis and Stephanides, 2005]. With this objective in mind, numerous models and frameworks have been 
proposed for securing enterprise information systems. Organizational security often focuses on the prevention of 
external threats, such as hackers and viruses, leaving organizations vulnerable to breaches from the inside [Spears 
and Barki, 2010]. Therefore, the threat of IS security breaches by internal personnel could be reduced if greater 
emphasis were placed on internal threats that can occur when employees handle corporate data in their day-to-day 
jobs (ibid). A socio-technical dimension is inherent in information security, and this dimension leaves opportunities 
for human errors (such as mistakes, lapses, disruption, distortion, destruction, and disclosure) to trigger a data 
breach incident [Schultz, 2005]. While researchers have proposed IS security models incorporating technical as well 
as non-technical aspects from a holistic perspective, research on insider threats motivation and mitigation is quite 
limited.  
 
One of the earliest IS security models is the detection model proposed by Lehmann [1981] which uses audit trails to 
track potential security violations.  Straub’s [1990] model for detection and discipline of computer abuse put more 
focus on evaluating investment in IT security, while  Trcek’s [2003]  multi-planes layered model for IS security 
focused on e-business systems security. Ganame, Bourgeois, Bidou, and Spies [2006] proposed a distributed 
Security Operation Center (SOC), which is able to detect attacks occurring simultaneously at several sites in a 
network, while a six-view perspective of system security was presented by Yadav [2010]. An aggregate of these 
models encompasses the use of one or more of the four mechanisms of deterrence theory [Straub and Welke, 
1998], while the use of neutralization technique [Siponen and Vance, 2010] throws light on the rationale  for 
disregarding/overlooking of IS security policies by employees. The neutralization theory originally proposed by 
Sykes and Matza claims that both law-abiding citizens and those who commit crimes or rule-breaking actions justify 
their actions by applying techniques of neutralization [ibid]. 
 
Table 2 summarizes research in the security threat domain, encompassing generic and insider threat models. From 
the table it can be seen that two streams of research provide valuable insights into the occurrence of security 
breaches as well as their prevention. First, a noticeable number of studies exists that focused on building security 
threat models based on the assumption that threat behaviors can be explained using one or more components of 
deterrence theory, namely deterrence, prevention, detection, and remedy. A second group of studies employed the 
motivation factor of insider threats to explain why employees violate security policies.  From an insider’s threat 
perspective, the motivation to attack is defined as the “motivational state that exists just prior to the commission of 
an act…. a measured reflection of a predisposition to commit corporate crime” [Paternoster and Simpson, 1996, p. 
561]. This motivation is driven mainly by an employee’s intrinsic values, perceptions and desires. As may be seen in 
Table 2, most insider threat research focused on the prevention, detection, mitigation, remediation, and punishment 
of unwelcome acts on the part of people and systems that have legitimate access to networks (Pfleeger and Stolfo, 
2009], while the motivation to attack is a domain to which less research has been devoted. In fact, out of the sixteen 
studies on security threats reported in Table 2, only two have delved into the ‘motivation’ factor, which reflects the 
lack of maturity of the literature on this topic and provides further motivation for the present research. Out of the five 
insider threat models shown in Table 2, neutralization theory [Siponen and Vance, 2010] provided justification for 
employee violations of security policies, while the systems dynamic model [Melara, Sarriegui, Gonzalez, Sawicka, 
and Cooke, 2003] traced the generic precursor incidents leading to the attack. In addition, earlier research focused 
mainly on the drivers behind the actual attacks, while the contribution of latent organizational system defects in the 
data breach has not been investigated. This research study aims to address these gaps by taking a more holistic 
approach, employing neutralization and system dynamics theories to identify the aggregating variables involved in 
insider threats, while using a multiple case study approach.  
 Table 2. Summary of Extent of Research on Generic and Insider Threats in IS 
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[Straub and 
Welke, 1998] 
Proposed a theory-based security program which includes the use of a 
security risk planning model, education/training in security awareness, and 
countermeasure matrix analysis, to reduce losses from computer abuse and 
disasters. 
    -  
[Trček, 2003] 
Presented a layered multi-plane model to manage E-business systems 
security by integrating existing technological, organizational and legal 
approaches in a balanced way. 
    - - 
[Ganame et 
al., 2006] 
Developed a distributed Security Operation Center which is able to detect 
network attacks occurring simultaneously at several sites 
    -  
[Yadav, 2010] 
Proposed a six-view perspective of a system security framework to identify a 
set of security risks and requirements. The framework was validated using a 
case study approach. 
    -  
[Solms, Haar, 
Solms, and 
Caelli, 1994] 
Proposed a model for information security management using data captured 
during security reviews.     - - 
[Beebe and 
Rao, 2010] 
Demonstrated that a meso-level application of situational crime prevention, 
combined with a traditional risk management process, can reduce residual 
information security risk. 
   - - - 
[Straub, 1990] 
Through empirical research, the author demonstrated how security 
countermeasures that include deterrent administrative procedures and 
preventive security software can significantly lower computer abuse. 
   - -  
[McLean, 
1992] 
Proposed the use of marketing campaigns to raise security awareness. 
  - - - - 
[Bagchi and 
Udo, 2003] 
Used the modified Gompertz forecasting model to analyze the growth patterns 
of computer and Internet crimes. They found that a relationship exists between 
security breaches and the usage of some security technologies.  
  - - -  
[Straub Jr and 
Nance, 1990] 
Used general deterrence theory to demonstrate how security measures, such 
as computer security awareness and security software, can help deter 
computer abuse.  
- -   -  
[Chinchani, 
Iyer, Ngo, and 
Upadhyaya, 
2004] 
Proposed a target-centric threat assessment model to address complex 
threats by identifying and then quantifying these threats. 
-   - -  
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[Lehmann, 
1981] 
Proposed a tool utilizing audit trails to enhance investigations once a security 
violation is detected or suspected. 
- -  - -  
[Bradford and 
Hu, 2005] 
Discussed augmenting intrusion detection systems with forensics tools to 
enhance the discovery and prosecution of internal attacks. 
-    - - 
[Siponen, 
Pahnila, and 
Mahmood, 
2007] 
Proposed a model to explain employees' adherence to IS security policies by 
integrating the General Deterrence Theory and the Theory of Reasoned 
Action with the Protection Motivation Theory (PMT). 
    -  
[Melara et al., 
2003] 
Presented an insider attack model using systems dynamics and proposed 
policies to minimize the risk of security failures, or at least to reduce the extent 
of damage in the event of an insider attack. 
-   -    
[Siponen and 
Vance, 2010] 
Used a theoretical model based on neutralization theory and sanctions of 
deterrence theory to enhance the understanding of IS security policy 
violations. They highlighted the need to take into account neutralization factors 
when developing and implementing security policies and practices 
- - -    
 
Since the paper looks at the aggravating variables from a malicious threat perspective, the motivation to attack by 
the insider is viewed from the point of view of the six neutralization techniques (defense of necessity, appeal to 
higher loyalty, condemn the condemners, metaphor of the ledger, denial of injury and denial of responsibility) 
[Siponen and Vance, 2010]. We argue that viewing insider threats through the lens of neutralization theory helps in 
exploring some of the  dynamics of these threats from a self-motive perspective. However, in addition to the insider’s 
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motivation to attack, there are other insider threat variables that are beyond the realm of neutralization. The above 
analysis leads us to formulate the following exploratory research question: “What are the aggravating variables 
that eventually accumulate and  trigger  insider attacks in an organization?”   
Insider Attack Motives and the Role of IT Controls  
Owing to the lack of theoretical and empirical evidence on the aggravating variables of insider threats, our review of 
the related literature helped in deriving an a priori model that captures the tentative pattern of  aggravating variables. 
Taking this a prior model as a starting point, we adopt an exploratory research approach to derive a better-validated 
theoretical model inductively from multiple case study data.  
 
A key information security problem for organizations is the lack of employee compliance with information security 
policies [Ernst and Young, 2008, Puhakainen, 2006, cited in Siponen and Vance, 2010]. In their research on 
employee security policy violations, Siponen and Vance [2010] stated that employees may use neutralization and 
rationalization techniques to justify or minimize the perceived harm of their policy violations. This theory leads to our 
first proposition which states that: Insiders use rationalization and neutralization to justify malicious actions/IT 
control violations. 
 
Internal controls are policies, procedures, practices, and organizational structures put in place to reduce risks [Kim, 
Robles, Sung-Eon, Yang-Seon, and Tai-Hoon, 2008]. Appropriate controls are necessary to protect organizations 
from legal suits for negligent duty, computer misuse, and data protection violations [Dhillon and Moores, 2001]. 
While a “control framework is a recognized system of control categories that covers all internal controls expected in 
an organization” [IIARF 2002, cited in Liu and Ridley, 2005, p. 2], an internal control provides reasonable assurance 
regarding the achievement of objectives in the area of operational efficiency, reliability of financial reporting, and 
regulatory compliance [Pathak, 2003]. Today, the adoption of IS control frameworks is on the rise, due to increasing 
pressures to comply with various data protection laws and regulations.  
 
An effective defense against insider attacks encompasses technology-based approaches, as well as an 
understanding of employees’ behavior, given that best practices in IS security control focus almost exclusively on 
implementing technological controls [Martinez-Moyano, Rich, Conrad, Andersen, and Stewart, 2008]. Thus, 
management of information security can only be adequately assured if the emphasis goes beyond technical controls 
and incorporates procedural controls by focusing on business process, policies, procedures, and organizational 
issues [Choobineh, Dhillon, Grimaila, and Rees, 2007; Ifinedo, 2009; Kruger and Kearney, 2006]. Moreover, 
employees’ lack of compliance with IS security policies is a key problem that security managers encounter in 
organizations [Siponen and Vance, 2010].  The above analysis on IT controls leads us to the second proposition that 
– Disregard for or overlooking of technical and non-technical IS security mechanisms (policies and 
procedures) by company employees is an important factor in aggravating IS security violations. 
User participation in IS security programs is an important factor in mitigating the incidence of intentional or 
accidental disregard for security policies. Further, the role of training and education as a proactive security approach 
remains relevant over the years [Cone, Irvine, Thompson, and Nguyen, 2007; George et al., 2008; Puhakainen and 
Siponen, 2010; Thomson and von Solms, 1998]. In this respect, organizational security controls that can detect, 
prevent, or minimize an IS security breach can only be effective if the people who are managing the IS in the 
organization are aware of these controls and adhere to them [Spears and Barki, 2010]. This evaluation on 
communication leads us to the third proposition, that: Ineffective communication of IS security policies and 
procedures increases the likelihood of insider attack. 
The above three factors - namely neutralization, disregard for and non-communication of IT security 
policies/procedures – account for the interaction of numerous dynamic variables in a successful insider attack. 
Moreover, through a single case study of a successful insider attack from a systems dynamics perspective, [Melara 
et al., 2003] noted that numerous precursors contribute to a malicious attack, and these can include management 
actions or inactions, among others. In a similar perspective, looking through the lens of the dynamic trigger 
hypothesis, a chain of events can lead to an insider attack, and despite being scattered, these events can be 
detected if the approach to them is properly structured. Therefore, identifying the sequence and pattern of these 
precursors would make these predecessor factors more conspicuous and would therefore improve the chance of 
detecting them [Andersen et al., 2004]. Consequently, the dynamic nature of the interplay among many data breach 
precursors leads to the fourth proposition that: A series of precursors  leads to a successful insider attack.   
 
The ensuing research question and the underlying propositions are summarized in Table 3. It is deduced that the 
aggravating threat variables stem from four major factors – namely, neutralization of malicious actions by insiders, 
disregard for/ overlooking of IT controls by employees, lack of effective communication of policies by the 
management, and a series of events/actions/inactions (precursors) that can lead to a successful malicious act.  
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 Table 3:  Research Question and Propositions 
Research 
Question 
What are the aggravating variables for insider threat in an organization? 
Proposition 1 Insiders use rationalization and neutralization to justify malicious actions/IT control 
violations. 
Proposition 2 Disregard for/overlooking of technical and non-technical IS security mechanisms is 
an important  factor in aggravating IS security violations. 
Proposition 3 Ineffective communication of IT controls (security policies and procedures) increases 
the likelihood of insider attack. 
Proposition 4 A series of precursors leads to a successful insider attack. 
 
By adopting a deductive approach from Yin [1994], our multiple case study aims to explain as far as possible the 
relationship between the dependent variable “insider threat”  and the tentative pattern of independent “aggravating 
variables ” identified from the literature review, which were posited to be influencing triggers of insider threats.  
IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS 
Methodology 
The underlying approach used for this research study is interpretive, since interpretive researchers start out with the 
assumption that access to reality is only possible through social constructions such as language, consciousness, 
and shared meanings [Myers, 1997].  As the study is exploratory in nature, a case study research methodology has 
been chosen since it “is a common way to do qualitative enquiry” [Stake, 2003, p. 443]. Moreover, it “investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident” [Yin, 1994, p. 13].  
 
Following the suggestion of Yin [1994], the sites were selected not only on an opportunistic basis (as access to 
companies who are willing to report internal data breaches was obviously limited), but also because of their diversity 
in terms of the characteristics of the firms involved, including the industry, company size and ownership model. The 
design of the case study, shown in Table 4, applies criteria used to assess IS case studies as outlined by Dubé and 
Paré [2001]. For this study, cases from organizations in Dubai (United Arab Emirates) that have experienced insider 
attacks were selected.  
 
Table 4: Design of the Case Study [Adapted from Dube and Pare, 2001]  
 Criteria Description 
Design of 
the case 
study 
Purpose of research Stated in the introductory section 
Research questions Stated in Section 3 
Single versus multiple-
case design 
Multiple cases - three cases in three different organizations 
that have experienced insider attacks. 
Selection of case(s) Organizations willing to narrate their cases of insider threat 
longitudinally for the purpose of research. 
Unit of analysis Interviews with IT Managers and IT Application/Strategy 
Managers in the selected organizations. 
Research context Cross-sectional study conducted over a period of fourteen 
months. 
Research Findings 
Out of the fourteen  organizations approached over a period of fourteen months to share and narrate cases of 
insider threats in their organizations, six  consented, and out of these six  cases, only four fit the ‘insider threat’ 
category. Since two cases were from the same sector, we report herein a total of three case studies, noting that the 
fourth case did not contribute anything new to our research findings. Hence, in this study, three cases will be 
analyzed (hereafter referred to as cases A, B, and C). Due to the sensitive nature of the study, anonymity was 
requested by the consenting organizations. The insiders had different profiles and motives across the three case 
studies. The first incident (Case A) involved an employee affiliated with an outsourcing partner who was assigned 
the task of writing a software code to integrate two financial systems. The second incident (Case B) involved an 
employee who was asked to resign after two weeks’ time for reasons of poor performance, and the third incident 
(Case C) involved an application support staff member who had access to a bank’s transaction processing system. 
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The first and third cases involved manipulation of financial data for profit, while the second case involved the theft of 
custodial data and trade secrets. Table 5 provides the case profile of the three respondents.  
Table 5: Profiles of the Case Studies Used 
Criteria Case A Case B Case C 
Sector Hospitality Event Management Banking 
IT controls COBIT No evidence of any IT 
control framework 
ITIL, industry IS 
security standard 
Breach reported to law 
enforcement agencies 
No No No 
Type of data breached Financial Custodial/ company 
secrets 
Financial 
Respondent (interviewee) IT Assistant Manager IT Application Manager IT Strategy Manager 
Approximate number of 
employees 
300 100 1200 
Approximate number of 
systems 
25 servers and 150 
computers 
15 servers and 75 
computers 
200 servers and 1400 
computers 
The empirical stage of the research was initiated during the second quarter of 2012 and continued until the final 
quarter of 2013. The interviews were transcribed and a few gray areas of the transcripts were cross-checked with 
the respondents through second follow-up interviews. The analysis of the five transcripts followed the five steps of 
qualitative analysis, namely tidying up the data, finding items, creating stable sets of items, creating patterns, and 
assembling structures [LeCompte, 2000]. The first three steps were accomplished by categorizing the raw data into 
themes, based on the four propositions (rationalization; disregard for technical and non-technical IT controls; role of 
communication; and multiple triggers). The remaining two steps aimed to corroborate or negate the propositions, 
thus answering the research question. This deductive approach leads to inductive reasoning where specific 
variables under each theme were extracted, thus creating patterns and assembling structures. The initial step 
involved transcribing the data using Express Scribe software and importing the digital text into the qualitative 
analysis software NVIVO. 
Case A (Insider as an authorized business partner) 
The company outsourced the task of integrating its financial systems and Hotel Management System (HMS) to an IT 
company contracted to develop various software integration modules in which “they have to test different cases and 
see the integration and all the stuff between systems”. The system integration required that when a guest booked a 
room online, with a credit card, the details of the payment transactions were transferred to the financials. Since 
financials were the most secure system, everything was pushed on to the financials from the HMS (instead of pulling 
the data) where the financials received the data to do the consolidation. During the coding phase, the programmer, 
assigned by the outsourced company, entered a malicious code whereby for every online booking transaction made, 
AED 5 (~US $1.36) were added to the original bill, and this sum was credited to his personal bank account. This 
amount was not visible in the HMS system, but when this information was pushed to the financials, this amount was 
added and was reflected in the customer’s credit card statement a month later. The irregularity was discovered 
during the User Acceptance Testing (UAT) phase by the company’s IT personnel. According to the respondent, one 
of the reasons the company’s financial network was breached was “when these people come on board, we used to 
take minimal precautions”. Moreover, according to the respondent, the incident happened because “we did not have 
the expertise in the (our) team to analyze what this guy was doing.” 
Aggravating Variables (neutralization): Case A 
Two sets of variables are evident in this case, one on the part of the insider and the other on the part of the 
organization which were, respectively, active  and latent  factors that led to neutralization. First, the system 
integration task was done by a lone programmer who according to the respondent “was a terrific developer. 
Everybody knew his talents and so he had the respect of his colleagues”, which was a contributing variable. 
Secondly, during the programming phase, the programmer asked for either overtime or more resources 
(programmers) to finish the job within the scheduled time frame.  This was denied by his own company. From the 
organizational side, the first omission is the IT control process where the respondent said “so now what happens 
was when these people come on board, we used to take minimal precautions.” Commenting on the second security 
flaw, the respondent stated that one of the ‘greatest threats’ facing the IT department was the constraint on the IT 
budget which forced outsourcing organizations to cut costs, leading to undesirable incidents. A third aggravating 
factor was the fact that the company “did not have the expertise in the team to analyze what this guy was doing”. 
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Finally, while the outsourcing contract was clear in terms of specifying the end results, it was not clear as to ‘how’ 
this would be achieved, leading the respondent to state that “Probably he was working on Java, with interface to an 
SQL database”.  Figure 2 summarizes the aggravating variables that led to neutralization in this particular case.   
 
  
Figure 2. Aggravating Variables Leading to Neutralization (Case A) 
Role of Compliance: Case A 
The organization had a policy that “the moment we are notified that such people are coming in we try to segregate 
them from the production network.” Thus, the organization did not only apply its policy of granting the business 
partner “access to a separate network”, but it also made “sure that all his equipment was scanned and then 
compliant with the policies.” However, according to the respondent, the issue was that “here we have a situation 
wherein OK, you provide him everything as per the policies and as per the compliance work, but still this guy is 
doing something within these limits and he is still able to pose a threat,” which is due to the “minimal IT controls in 
place”. Regarding the role of technical controls the respondent states “…then you have ….. another question now. 
Even after the evolution of technology, how can these kinds of things be minimized? I think it’s again a…..it’s a very 
questionable situation.” This statement implies that the technical controls were inadequate and, at the same time, 
indirectly points out the role of non-technical controls in IS security. Figure 3 summarizes the aggregative variables 
related to IT controls for Case A. 
 
Figure 3. Aggravating Variables for IT Controls (Case A) 
 
Communication of Policies: Case A 
In this case, the organization had policies and procedures that were communicated to its employees through 
orientation sessions that targeted only select groups of employees.  In this regard, the respondent stated that a 
single training session was given, and then only to newly recruited junior staff at orientation, while middle and senior 
level employees were not provided with any orientation or training, because of the misconception that newly 
recruited junior staff are more prone to make mistakes than others. Regarding the communication of policies to the 
outsourced staff, the respondent stated that “we have communicated our policies and procedures to the project 
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manager (of the outsourced company) and we don’t know whether these have been communicated to their 
employees here.” In this case, the company depended on the outsourced company to communicate the policies to 
its employees. Figure 4 depicts the aggravating variables related to communication policy for this particular case 
study. 
  
  
  
Figure 4. Aggravating Variables for Communication of Policies (Case A) 
Case B (Insider as an employee who was given two weeks to leave) 
This case involved a secretary in an event management company who was asked to leave due to poor performance. 
She was the secretary to the CEO and since there was nobody else to take over her job, she was given two weeks’ 
notice prior to leaving until a suitable replacement could be found. During this time, she used her privileged access 
(being the secretary to the CEO) to access sensitive documents, contracts, and the CEO’s profile and emailed them 
to the next company she was moving on to (in this case a competitor). This breach was detected by the IT staff 
through an IT control that was configured to send an alert when certain keywords were detected by the email server.  
Aggravating Variables (neutralization): Case B 
The foremost motivational factor behind this breach was the secretary’s discontent when she was asked to leave 
due to poor performance. In the meantime, she found a new job opportunity with a competitor and this prompted her 
to channel the company’s custodial data and trade secrets to this competitor. In this case,  the company did not take 
the necessary measures to limit her access to sensitive data once she was notified of her termination.  So, “this was 
done on trust, because HR knew that this lady was going but they were keeping her for a short period of time” and 
“they didn’t understand the amount of threat that this person could pose to the entire organization.” When the human 
resource personnel confronted the secretary regarding this data breach, she claimed that she was simply taking the 
templates that she created. The aggravating variables leading to neutralization for this case are illustrated in Figure 
5.  
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Figure 5. Aggravating Variables Leading to Neutralization (Case B) 
Role of Compliance: Case B 
During the two-week extension, “nobody understood what she was doing” until someone on the IT team noticed 
“weird attachments going from one particular IP address” where it was noticed that “she was sending emails, getting 
emails, and stuff like that.” The data breach was detected thanks to technical controls. The company used IBM Lotus 
notes as the mail server: they configured policies in the outgoing email server with certain keywords; an alert would 
be triggered if these keywords were detected. When they checked the secretary’s inbox, they found out that she had 
sent copies of high profile contracts as well as the curriculum vitae of the CEO to her prospective employer. The 
breached information contained custodial information as well as trade secrets. According to the respondent, the 
presence of IT controls stopped the breach midway “so this is where ...IT controls (worked), since we were able to 
monitor all the outgoing traffic.”  Here the presence and use of technical controls were effective to the extent of 
preventing further data breaches, but not effective in preventing it at the outset. From a proactive perspective, the 
respondent stated that “when you put down your papers (resign or are asked to leave), your rights (IT) are trimmed. 
So this was overlooked”. Another point expressed by the respondent regarding IT controls was the intensive 
monitoring process required when a person resigns or is dismissed. In this regard, the respondent stated that 
“during the notice period, your activities are closely monitored, but this was not done” in this case. Figure 6 illustrates 
the aggravating variables related to IT controls in this particular case.  
 
   
Figure 6. Aggravating Variables for IT Controls (Case B)  
Communication of Policies: Case B 
According to the respondent, one factor that prompted the insider to leak company data was her possible lack of 
awareness of the data privacy policies. In this regard, the respondent stated “then again the ignorance, then you 
begin to think, but if she’s copying the templates, why do you take the content inside the templates” and to date, the 
company “doesn’t know what kind of information has gone out.” Here, when probed further, the term ‘ignorance’ is 
used by the respondent to indicate the lack of awareness of polices among staff. Regarding the enforcement of 
policies, the respondent’s comment that “nobody bothered to enforce”, was a clear indication that the 
communications were not effective, thus differentiating ‘communication’ from ‘effective communication.’  When 
asked about continuous training in IT policies and the relevance of that training, the respondent stated that 
“managers (IT) don’t like to send the staff for training since the priority is to finish the work” and “department heads 
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should know the importance of training.” Figure 7 summarizes the aggravating variables of policy communication for 
this case study. 
   
Figure 7. Aggravating Variables for Communication Policies (Case B) 
Case C (Insider as trusted key IT support staff) 
This case concerns a local bank that provides a wide spectrum of retail and commercial banking services. The 
insider is a key member of application support staff who used his privileged access to insert a malicious .xls file into 
the bank’s batch file transfer system. The malicious file would automatically execute an unauthorized transaction in 
favor of the insider. The bank’s corporate accounts involve monthly debit transactions whereby employees’ monthly 
salaries are credited to their bank accounts using a special .xls spreadsheet.  This file contains the employee ID, 
name, account number, days worked, deductions, and amount to be debited along with the electronic payment. The 
double entry process of debiting the corporate account and crediting the employee account is done through batch 
processing. The insider replicated the genuine salary transfer process by creating a malicious .xls file with a list of 
charges (credited to his account) that were executed along with the normal .xls file during the salary transfer 
process. Hence, when the salary was transferred  to an employee’s account, the .xls file was activated and a small 
amount of 1 or 2 dirhams (less than $1) was debited from the bank’s corporate account and credited to the insider’s 
account. Since the bank had hundreds of corporate customers, the breach affected thousands of individuals. 
 
The malicious act was discovered when, on one occasion, the operating (non-IT) staff member encountered a 
transaction processing error, which they suspected might be the result of an accounting error. Following the 
standard procedures, the employee called the application support person (the “insider”) to resolve the issue. 
However, in this particular case, the insider could not be reached and hence the operating staff member had to 
escalate the issue to a Tier-2 expert agent who came to the server room to investigate the incident. While examining 
the batch file transfer system, the agent detected some suspicious transactions in which small amounts were 
debited from the bank’s corporate accounts and credited to the insider’s account in the same bank.  It was revealed 
that a malicious accounting entry had triggered the fraudulent transaction.   
Aggravating Variables (neutralization): Case C 
In this case, the respondent identified three latent aggravating variables - each from the insider’s and management 
perspective. First, the insider had “a luxurious lifestyle and (was) living beyond his means” which management was 
well aware of before the breach was detected, but it was not given much consideration. Secondly, the trust placed in 
the insider as well as the privilege given to him to manage the bank’s transaction processing system was another 
contributing factor. Other than that, the respondent could not find any aggravating variable on the part of the 
organization that would create discontent for the insider. While the habit of spending beyond his means gave the 
insider a motive to insert the malicious code, “the confidence placed in him……, which is the only and main factor” 
and the “free hand given by the management” along with the “privileged access” provided the key drivers for the 
insider to commit the data breach. Moreover management placed “full confidence” in, and “depended” on him.  The 
aggravating variables leading to neutralization for this case are shown in Figure 8. 
 
Employees were expected 
to know about the policies 
 
 
Communication 
policy 
Communications of policies were 
not effective in bringing compliance 
Communications done 
Communications 
overlooked/ disregarded 
Non-existence of training and 
awareness programs on. IT policies 
  
 
Volume xx Article x 
 
Figure 8. Aggravating Variables Leading to Neutralization (Case C) 
Role of Compliance: Case C 
From a compliance perspective, the predominance of non-technical controls should not be overlooked due to the 
insider being a key IT staff member. While technical controls may prove futile, three actions on the part of 
management relating to non-technical controls have been overlooked/disregarded.  
 
First, the member of the bank’s application support staff “was empowered to access live systems to support the 
banking application system” (using high privilege access), where “the intention was to keep the banking services 
running uninterruptedly” since, “the bank had a large network of branches and a big client base”.  
 
Secondly, as “he had a free hand to report to work at any time in the morning and work any time”, the malicious act 
was performed at times when most of the bank’s staff was off-duty.  
 
Thirdly, “due to the criticality of the banking operations, he had been vested with high respect and trust by the IT 
department and management”. While ‘empowerment’ and ‘trust’ are essential elements of a working environment, 
the absence of proper monitoring mechanisms normally embodied in IT controls that are up to industry standards 
may facilitate fraudulent activities within the financial institution. This was evident from the respondent’s statement 
that “his work was never supervised or audited as the bank financial transactions were performed without any 
interruptions or complaints. The reason was that he was supporting 24x7 operations of the banking system.”  When 
asked what the bank could have done to avoid the breach, the respondent replied that the “developer should not 
have access to a live environment” and that if controls had been implemented,  “this should not have happened”. 
Hence, “nobody suspected that he would do such an act.” When asked about the IT controls at the time of the 
incident, the respondent replied that the bank had implemented ITIL and industry-standard IT controls related to IS 
security, but not the COBIT framework, nor the ISO 27 K standard.   
 
Figure 9 shows the aggravating variables related to IT control for this case. All these latent variables acted as 
precursor events leading to the malicious act. 
Communication of Policies: Case C 
According to the respondent, the bank had meticulously communicated its security policies. “There was not any 
lapse in any communication”, and the bank also conducted a “continuous training and awareness program” for its IT 
staff; in addition, IT polices were communicated “appropriately”. When further quizzed about any potential lapses in 
communicating security policies to the insider, the respondent fully defended the bank’s communication program at 
that time. The aggravating variables of policy communication for this case are illustrated in Figure 10. 
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Figure 9. Aggravating Variables for IT Controls (Case C) 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Aggravating Variables for Communication of Policies (Case C) 
 
V. DISCUSSION 
While the previous section focused on a multiple case analysis with a reasonable element of interpretation in the 
form of explicit and implied statements, this section goes one step further, identifying patterns and assembling the 
overall structure of the variables into deduced propositions and induced themes, thus answering the research 
question in the context of this study. Given that the four propositions corroborate the responses found in the  
interview transcripts, a prescriptive model, henceforth referred to as the Insider Threat Aggravating Variables (ITAV) 
model, has been derived. This ITAV model follows a two-tier simple influence diagram which delineates the 
dependent and independent variables and the relationship among them (Palvia, Midha, and Pinjani, 2006).   
As shown in Figure 11, the ITAV model identifies the five theoretical constructs, the attributes within each construct, 
the associations, the state space and the events they cover, which encompass the ‘parts’ of a theory (Weber, 2012). 
The constructs not only support the four propositions but also lead to a fifth proposition: 
P5:  IT decisions by management affect the security threat level of organizations 
In particular: 
- Economizing on IT security resources deployment leads to increased security risks.  
- Lack of contextualization of contingent or emergent security scenarios with relevant IT controls leads to 
increased security threats.  
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The analysis of these cases indicated that multiple precursor events trigger a successful data breach by malicious 
insiders, which justifies the interdependent associations among the constructs. The state space of our model 
encompasses only those employees with malicious intent, and who have normal and/or privileged access to 
organizational information systems. Currently, the events in our model cover deliberate modification and disclosure 
of corporate data. 
  
Figure 11. The insider threat aggravating variables (ITAV) model  
Proposition – 1 
This proposition (Table 2), states that insiders use rationalization and neutralization to justify their malicious acts or 
to bypass IT controls. This proposition has proven to be true in all three cases. In this respect, two types of variables 
are evident - active and latent variables. While active variables are explicit, latent variables are implicit and support 
the active variables. For example, in the first case, the insider (the outsourced employee) gained the complete 
confidence of his colleagues (latent variable), and thus no one suspected him of manipulating the program, which 
prevented the company IT personnel from monitoring him (latent variable on the part of employees). In this regard, 
Colwill (2009) stated that outsourcing can lead to the fragmentation of protection barriers and controls that increases 
the number of people treated as full-time employees. In all three cases, there were active variables which prompted 
the insider to breach the IT security perimeter, while in the third case, there were no active aggravating variables to 
instigate the data breach. However, full empowerment given to the insider along with the absence of or continuous 
overlooking/disregarding of IT controls on the part of the management (latent variables) led to the insider attack 
Proposition – 2 
This proposition states that the overlooking of, or disregard for, technical and non-technical IS security mechanisms 
is an important contributing factor in aggravating IS security violations. While the overlooking/disregarding of existing 
IT controls is an influencing factor, absence of IT controls can also contribute to data breaches. In the first case 
study, the company took reasonable (i.e. adequate in terms of industry standards) precautions, but three latent 
factors which went unnoticed (minimal precautions, no monitoring, no in-house expertise) led to the breach. In this 
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case, however, the aggravating factor was ‘neutralization’ rather than the presence of the three latent  factors 
(minimal IT controls in place, no expertise to monitor insider job, and lack of knowledge of the programs the insider 
was working on). In the second case, termination of the employee proved to be the major variable followed by the 
lack of IT controls (both active  variables). In the third case, the complete confidence on the part of the IT personnel 
in the employee (insider) led to the overlooking/disregarding of two major IT controls (active variables) which 
ultimately led to the ongoing data breach. In this respect, Martinez-Moyano et al. (2008) state that an organizational 
focus on external threats can lead to complacency, allowing an insider to gain confidence by exploiting known 
weaknesses in organizational defenses. 
Proposition – 3 
The findings corroborate proposition 3, which states that ineffective communication of IT controls to employees is a 
factor which can contribute to a data breach. However, as revealed in case C, the presence of proper 
communication concerning IT security policies and procedures cannot by itself safeguard against internal attacks. 
This finding is in accordance with earlier studies that found that employee violations of established IS security 
policies are often due to employees’ negligence or ignorance of these policies (Puhakainen, 2006, cited in Siponen 
and Vance, 2010; Vroom and Von Solms, 2004).  
 
In the first two cases there was no evidence of ongoing training or orientation on IT controls by the respective 
organizations/divisions to the outsourced business partner or to their own employees, a situation confirmed by the 
respondents. This finding reflects the need for training IT personnel to think about the different scenarios in which 
each IT control can be applied or circumvented. Furthermore, IT security and governance controls are inherently 
generic, which makes it difficult for organizations to come up with controls for each plausible scenario. In this 
respect,  (Greitzer, Moore, Cappelli, Andrews, and Carroll, 2008) acknowledge that there currently exists a paucity of 
training, especially innovative training on insider threat for individuals with different roles and responsibilities within 
organizations.   
Proposition – 4 
Our study revealed that data breaches by insiders can stem from the cumulative actions of multiple (active and 
latent) variables, as well as the actions/inactions of insiders, IT personnel, and management. From the three cases, 
we ascertained that it takes multiple factors to trigger an insider attack. Thus, organizations need to take adequate 
precautions to thwart insider threats, as some security layers might be easily penetrated or could be costly to 
maintain. Likewise, from a non-technical point of view, it is not economically feasible for all organizations to take the 
utmost of precautions in all aspects of technical and non-technical security and at the same time satisfy the requests 
of all employees, keep all employees content, implement all available IT controls, while continually communicating 
polices in an effective manner, and making IT decisions with the greatest diligence and care.  
Proposition – 5 (new) : IT Decisions by Management 
While analyzing and corroborating the responses with the first three research propositions in Table 3, a fifth category 
of latent aggravating variables emerged from the empirical data, which the researchers have called “IT decisions” 
since these are high-level decisions made by the IT management, regardless of whether these decisions are made 
at the departmental or the managerial level. In fact, the existence of two latent variables (cost and time) and the 
absence of a third variable (contextualization) also contributed to the reported data breaches. In the first case, 
management’s decision to cut cost and not to delay the project led to two active variables (rejecting requests for 
overtime and for additional resources), which in turn resulted in the data breach. According to the respondent in 
case A, the company allocated two experts to go through the entire code line by line to determine the potential 
malicious code. This endeavor took two months which calls into question the decision to cut cost and time, in the 
first place. 
 
Contextualization is the process of mapping an emerging or contingent situation with the IT control of a well-drafted 
policy. This was categorized under ‘management’ since it is the responsibility of the management to train the 
employees to map IT controls in different contexts. With regard to ‘contextualization’, Koliadis, Desai, Narendra, and 
Ghose (2010) stated that with the increasing legislative and regulatory concerns, the key challenge facing 
organizations is to understand and communicate high-level compliance policies in natural language, and interpret 
them for a particular usage context. These interpreted policies can then be represented in formal language and used 
to automatically verify compliance of IT/business process executions against the same policies. In this regard, IT 
personnel should be trained not only in IT controls, but also in the interpretation and application of policies in 
different contexts. This requires training and scenario planning on the part of the management. The lack of 
contextualization becomes evident in each of the three cases.    
Cross-case Analysis 
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According to Yin (1994), a multiple case design can follow literal replication logic (predicting similar results across 
cases) or use a theoretical replication strategy (conditions of the case lead to predicting contrasting results but for 
predictable reasons). The initial decision regarding the satisfactory number of cases is three to four for a literal 
replication (Yin, 1994). In our case, we used literal replication logic to strengthen the robustness and reliability of our 
findings by constantly comparing and possibly matching the results of one case study with the results of ensuing 
cases. As illustrated in Table 6, a cross-case analysis shows that in all three cases, there was an accumulation of 
multiple events of different magnitude which triggered a data breach, thus confirming the proposition that no single 
active or latent variable was sufficient to prompt a successful attack. In addition, since, in most of the cases, the 
identified patterns associated with insider threats were similar, in the aggregate, we have considerable evidence to 
support the initial set of propositions (Eisenhardt, 1989). Further, our comparative multiple case approach enabled 
not only the replication of individual patterns, as suggested by the four propositions, but also the extension of the 
theoretical constructs by suggesting a fifth aggravating variable that has not been identified by the literature.  
 
From a threat prediction perspective, understanding the precursor events provides ample opportunity for 
management to take proactive actions, which also leads to two important observations. First, no single control 
guarantees security in and of itself, as each control has its own unique role within a security architecture, thus a 
layered defense architecture (Hasan Cavusoglu, Cavusoglu, and Raghunathan, 2004) becomes necessary. 
Secondly, access control and privileges must be properly designed and supervised so that no single person should 
be able to control the system from front to back with unrestricted access (Melara et al., 2003). Through the use of 
the ITAV model we have illustrated the variables that can help management understand the nature of insider threats 
and thus guide organizations towards taking proactive steps to eliminate or mitigate the effects of these threats.     
 
Table 6. Cross-case Analysis Results 
Aggregating variable Case A 
(Hospitality) 
Case B  
(Event management) 
Case C 
(Financial institution) 
Neutralization and 
rationalization  Defense of necessity 
Defense of necessity/ 
condemnation of the 
condemners 
Defense of necessity/ 
Denial of injury 
Overlooking/ 
disregarding of IT 
policies  
Minimal IT controls in 
place; overlooking/ 
disregarding of non-
technical IT controls 
Technical IT controls 
used for detection; 
lack/overlooking/ 
disregarding of non-
technical controls 
Overlooking/disregarding 
of technical as well as 
non-technical IT controls 
Ineffective 
communication of 
policies  
Lack of re-enforcement 
of communication; lack 
of communication to 
outsourced staff 
Lack of 
communication/training/ 
enforcement of policies 
X 
Multiple precursors  4 active and 6 latent  
precursor events  
4 active and 2 latent 
precursor events 
10 latent precursor events 
IT managerial 
decisions 
Cost and time; lack of 
contextualization 
Lack of 
contextualization 
Lack of contextualization 
  
External Validity  
As highlighted by Yin (1994, pp. 30-32), the purpose of this multiple case study research has not been to seek 
statistical generalization to a larger population - a technique customary in survey research - as individual cases are 
not sampling units. Rather, the study aspires to theoretical or analytical generalization of “a particular set of results 
to some broader theory” (Yin, 1994, p. 36) and not to populations or universe. Accordingly, as a multiple case study, 
this research initiative sought analytical generalization to replicate and expand the emergent theory of the 
aggravating variables of insider attacks by allowing deep analysis of each case as well as cross-comparison and 
contrast among the cases involved. By adopting replication logic and a sequential approach, we were able to 
progressively acquire via the first three cases certain in-depth information as well as convergent patterns regarding  
the important mediating factors of insider threats that might be applicable to other situations. We have also 
examined another fourth case and found that it did not add significant new insights to what we already knew, hence 
we determined that adequate theoretical saturation had already occurred. According to Yin (1994, p 31), in an 
analytical generalization, a previously developed theory is used as a template with which to cross-check the cases’ 
empirical results and “if two or more cases are shown to support the same theory, replication may be claimed”. 
Therefore it is through this replication logic in our multiple case study design that we have strengthened  the external 
validation of our findings (Yin, 1994, p. 35), as distinct from findings emanating exclusively from a single case.  
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VI. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
Drawing on the related literature and by analyzing three case studies concerning organizations from different sectors 
that had experienced insider attacks, we were able to categorize the aggregating variables which led to insider 
threats into five theoretical constructs – namely: neutralization, employee actions and inactions in the form of non-
adherence to security policies, the lack of effective communication of security policies, the presence of multiple 
precursor events  and the decisions made by management.  
 
Our empirical study contributes to both insider threats research and practice by reducing the gap between these two 
fields in order to guide managerial actions towards a better understanding of the cues announcing insider attacks. In 
particular, through the three case studies examined, we encountered empirical evidence validating the four 
propositions identified from previous literature, and also identified a new (fifth) construct which relates to decisions 
made by IT management which may eventually lead to insider attacks. Our theoretical model explains the ‘how’ 
(process) and the ‘why’ (reasons) of the insider attack phenomenon, thus categorizing it under the theory of 
explaining and understanding (Gregor, 2006). Our research enabled us to build validated theoretical constructs and 
propositions from case-based empirical evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989). Accordingly, this contribution provides 
researchers with real data on insider attacks which contributes to a better understanding of the aggregating 
variables of insider threats. The study can therefore advance academic research in the area of insider threats by 
guiding academicians towards developing better taxonomies and predictive models for insider attacks. According to 
Schultz (2002)the most persistent need emanating from research on insider threats is developing predictive models 
that can assist in preventing insider attacks.  
 
From a practitioner’s perspective, our empirically validated conceptual model for the aggregating variables of insider 
threats provides guidance to practitioners for developing a more holistic approach toward protecting their 
organizations against insider attacks. Our analysis of the three cases of insider threats showed that insider attacks 
can be effectively detected from initial cues, provided that IT personnel are adequately equipped with mechanisms 
to detect, analyze, and respond to these cues early on. Hence, our model can guide practitioners to proactively 
manage insider threats and integrate insider threat mechanisms into the overall risk management process. As 
Bishop et al. (2008) affirmed, if we cannot define the insider threat problem and its underlying factors properly, then 
we will not be able to come up with a solution. In addition, it can be asserted that combining insider monitoring 
mechanisms with overall risk control may increase the probability of detecting insider threats (Yang and Wang, 
2011).  
 
A major theme that emerged from our study is the fact that several intertwining factors interplay to lead to an internal 
data breach. In fact, analysis of the three cases showed that the actions of the insider alone do not in themselves 
make up a data breach. Rather, it is through additional aggravating variables originating with the actions and 
inactions of IT personnel and management that data breach incidents occur. In particular, we found that individual 
behaviors and motives are not the only causal factors behind insider attacks. Put differently, insider threats are 
sometimes the results of circumstances that are outside the realm of those who were directly linked to the threat. A 
major implication of this finding is the need for organizations to focus their attention beyond the motives behind the 
actual act of insider attack and consider as well other latent technological, managerial, and organizational system 
defects. Thus, a significant finding to emerge from this study is that insider threats are avertable through preventive 
managerial decisions and actions. Our research also advocates the need for setting up contextually-based IT 
security governance and policies to account for insider data breach risks and minimize them. Such a holistic view of 
the precursors of insider attacks has not been addressed in extant literature.  
 
Future research might undertake to further develop the work done here in any of various directions: 
 
Although our multiple case-study allowed the replication and extension among the three individual cases, a more 
case-based research initiative in different contexts might provide additional literal replications leading to a greater 
degree of certainty. One of the questions raised by Ifinedo (2009) is whether security concerns vary according to 
socioeconomic contexts. This question might be explored further, through an effort to widen empirical research on 
the five constructs to investigate whether the attributes that define these constructs remain the same or vary across 
different geographical locations, cultures and/or sectors.  From a similar perspective, since our research focused 
only on deliberate insider attacks, we would also encourage future empirical studies on internal data breaches that 
are triggered by unintentional human error. Such studies might then help extend the generalizability of our model to 
cover the full range of aggregating variables leading to data breaches.     
 
An employee’s attitude is influenced by the benefits of compliance, the cost of compliance, and the cost of 
noncompliance, which involve beliefs about the overall assessment of consequences of compliance or 
noncompliance (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). Starting from our second theoretical construct of employee actions/inactions 
in regard to adherence to security policies, further research could identify which of the three compliance factors are 
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dominant within the context of insider threats. In addition, and from an organizational behavior perspective, the 
‘motivation’ factors behind insider attacks could be researched, examining both the intrinsic and extrinsic 
‘moderating’ factors of these attacks.  
 
It has been stated that organizations do not currently place great emphasis on developing aware and responsible 
information users (Young and Windsor, 2010). In this regard, taking the communication management construct into 
account, we would encourage further research into the optimal communication mix for effective communication of 
security policies. 
 
Gupta, Chaturvedi, and Mehta (2011) posited that if an organization faces external threats from highly-skilled 
perpetrators, triggering severe disciplinary measures, then it would  be beneficial for organizations to increase 
budgetary allocation for disaster-recovery technologies even if this were to involve reduced investment in security 
technologies. However, if the attackers demonstrate a low level of skill, then it would be better to increase 
investment in security technologies instead. Taking the fifth construct (IT managerial decisions) into account, we 
would encourage further research into management budgetary allocation strategies for security technologies from an 
insider threat perspective.  
 
Finally, while distilling and analyzing the various variables, we did not take into consideration the relative weighting 
of these variables. Future research might explore their respective roles and ascertain the weighting for active as well 
as latent variables in a successful insider attack. The weights assigned as a result may be able to assist 
practitioners in better quantifying the risk of insider threats, thus leading to the development of more effective risk 
management frameworks. 
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